Appeal of TAMARA TITCH from action of the Board of Education of the Andes Central School District regarding a personnel matter.

Decision No. 18,531

(December 10, 2024)

Guercio & Guercio LLP, attorneys for respondent, Erin M. O’Grady-Parent, Esq., of counsel

ROSA., Commissioner.--Petitioner appeals the decision of the Board of Education of the Andes Central School District (“respondent” or “board”) to discontinue her probationary appointment.  The appeal must be dismissed.

Petitioner was hired by respondent as a music teacher beginning in September 2004.  She received tenure in 2008 and resigned in 2017.  Respondent then rehired petitioner in 2023.  It is unclear from the record whether petitioner was hired as a substitute or a full-time teacher at that time. 

During the 2023-2024 school year, respondent learned that petitioner did not possess a valid teaching certificate.  Respondent further asserts that petitioner yelled at a colleague in the presence of students and made inappropriate “demands” to the board.  Thereafter, the superintendent recommended petitioner’s discontinuance, which respondent approved at its meeting on April 18, 2024.  This appeal ensued.

Petitioner argues that respondent improperly discontinued her employment by “covering up” her employment history.  She further asserts that the former superintendent entered erroneous information in petitioner’s TEACH account.[1]  Petitioner seeks an order reinstating her to her teaching position and “correct[ion]” of her TEACH account.[2]

Respondent argues that petitioner has failed to prove that her separation from employment was unlawful.

I must address two preliminary matters.  First, some of petitioner’s claims must be dismissed as untimely.  An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the decision or act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown (8 NYCRR 275.16; Appeal of Saxena, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,239; Appeal of Lippolt, 48 id. 457, Decision No. 15,914).  Petitioner commenced this appeal by service of the petition on May 14, 2024.  Therefore, claims arising more than 30 days beforehand—including petitioner’s allegations regarding her resignation in 2017 and her loss of tenure rights in connection therewith—must be dismissed as untimely. 

Even if petitioner’s challenge to her tenure status were timely, she relinquished her tenure rights within the district following her resignation in 2017 (Appeal of Ahmad, 58 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,548; Matter of Middleton, 16 id. 50, Decision No. 9,296, reopening denied 16 id. 366, Decision No. 9,433).  Thus, even assuming that petitioner was hired as a teacher in 2023, she was appropriately afforded the process due a probationary teacher prior to her discontinuance.

Turning to the merits, the services of a probationary teacher may be discontinued at any time during the probationary period unless the teacher shows that a board terminated service for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, in violation of a statutory proscription, or in bad faith (Education Law § 3012 [1] [a]; Matter of Frasier v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763 [1988]; James v Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1 of the Towns of Orangetown & Clarkstown, 37 NY2d 891 [1975]; Appeal of Newton, 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,007; Appeal of Tahir, 46 id. 16, Decision No. 15,426). 

In an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884).

The superintendent articulated three reasons for recommending petitioner’s discontinuance:  (1) lack of certification; (2) an October 2023 “outburst in the hallway … where [petitioner] ... ma[de] accusations and/or yell[ed] at the [s]uperintendent and/or other staff in a public area where students were present and/or nearby”; and (3) her submission of a January 2024 “demand” letter to the board.[3]  Petitioner acknowledges that she lacked appropriate certification but alleges that the former superintendent “criminally changed” information in her TEACH account.  Petitioner further claims that her alleged lack of professionalism was relatively “minimal” or justifiable.  Petitioner additionally asserts that her letter to the board was intended to elevate morale within the district.

“Respondent has a statutory obligation to employ only ‘qualified’ teachers” (Appeal of Moss, 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,006; see Education Law §§ 3001, 3009, 3010).  As such, it appropriately separated petitioner from employment based upon her lack of certification.  Petitioner has not explained how respondent’s former superintendent could have modified her TEACH account, which only she could access (Appeal of Campbell, 61 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,014 [taking administrative notice of information published by the State Education Department explaining the operation of the TEACH system]).

Moreover, petitioner has failed to show that the superintendent’s two reasons for recommending discontinuance were unlawful or made in bad faith.  “[A] school district may provide any reason [for discontinuance] so long as it is honest, consistent with federal and State law, and detailed enough to facilitate a reasonable and logical reply thereto” (Appeal of Rickson, 63 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,410 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).  While petitioner downplays the significance of these incidents, she does not contest their accuracy.  Accordingly, she has not met her burden of proof and the appeal must be dismissed (Appeal of Rosselli-Dabool, 62 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,262).

To the extent they are not addressed herein, petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

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